Objectives: To reflect on the nature of ethics, from a contemporary perspective, and also on which features of the family relationship have an impact on the interface between genetics and pediatrics.
sufficiently close to me to oblige me to perceive its existence as absolutely real.
Therefore, what the Other originally represents to me is not just a theoretical problem, but a concrete event that destabilizes the certainties of my intelligence. I cannot, in any way whatsoever, determine that which the Other is as long as it remains that which it is, I cannot say what it really is: I can merely say what I manage to capture of it, what of it I can perceive and classify. Strictly speaking, the only thing that I can venture to say with respect of this Other is determined precisely by that Other itself: that it is of another mannerotherly -that I, or rather, between us, a true and irreducible difference holds sway. 5 However, despite this difference that we cannot overcome either by intelligence or knowledge, we can approach one another. The differences remain, but we can encounter one another. This encounter will not be a theoretical question -since, were it to be so, we would be back in the field of mental representation, in the field of the idea of the "other" that we already have -but a question that is fundamentally ethical, practical, since it deals with the concrete Other with which we encounter, and not an image of it. When we really meet someone, we do not at first "resolve" this other person in our minds, we do not consider them an object, a function that they perform or some number or other, we consider them to be an
Other that may say "no" to my "yes", and to which we do not attribute a classification, but of whom we ask their name; and this we call an "encounter". 6 
The Encounter
Here, "encounter", in the first instance, means to be open to the Other, i.e. to the not-yet-known. What is meant by this is not only one of the easiest things to imagine, but also one of the hardest things to achieve. This is because this openness implies my finding myself in a position that could radically be called into question, in a position of insecurity, by the mere appearance of alteration (from the Latin alter, other), that is to say, the condition of other in relation to me. 4 And this is because no promise of conciliation comes from the Other, just an understanding that the totality of my conceptions are unable to do it justice. I cannot, truly, explain it, I can only, in radical terms, relate to it. The Other, which is not simply placed in front of me, which is not, in relation to me, any kind of object, but which comes to me, signifies, to the extent that it remains other, a new event, unexpected, traumatic.
On the other hand this does not only signify a radical insecurity on my part, but also -and most importantly -the possibility, or even a positive necessity, of a new beginning, starting from an irreversible rupture of my cognitive self-reference. For I must restart the process of understanding the world in which this encounter has taken place, since my representations and cosmovisions, adequate as they were for the comfort of my previous logical position, are unable to deal with the event that the emergence of the other in my world signifies. Ethics demand, so to speak, a different logic from the logic of intelligence, and this is intended to mean that ethics -expressed in the real encounter demands a different type of rationality, different from that which I use normally to deal with things and concepts -specifically, an ethical rationality, or, in more simple terms, a rationality of the encounter with the other. 
Encounter-driven thinking
The form in which the world is originally conceived determines, to a certain extent, the rationality of that world, the form in which it is understood later. If the world is not initially conceived and thought of in terms of abstract principles or in terms of the interactions of interests of power, pure and simple, but in terms of real human encounters in their infinite variety, this means that it is possible to conceive of another rationality in the midst of those that already exist -an ethical rationality. 7 However, one might question whether the mere idea of an ethical rationality does not sound, to a certain extent, unreal:
an unrealistic task or construction.
One answer is already sketched out in principle: what is very real is the absolute necessity for such a rationality, unless we understand human beings to be cogs in a machine and intend to substitute human meaning whatever that may befor the instrumental meaning of alienation of the human in things, powers and violence.
However, the idea of an ethical rationality does not presuppose that each and every concept of reality and of the world that has existed to date should be abandoned in order to institute something completely new. What is being said here is that a unitary view of the world, based, for example, on exclusively scientific schema, is incapable of doing justice to the real human world. No mathematical reasoning, for example, can transcend its specific scope and propose itself as the fundamentals of a human world, of the truly human action that is to relate to another -unless, by "human", one understands mathematical entities. This is because the pri- what is beyond myself, providing the opportunity for rationality to flower, a rationality that understands the world from the perspective of the meaning of the encounter. For things also present a face that invites encounter -as Art knows so welland reality assumes the significance of an invitation to a relationship -but to a relationship of caring. It is perhaps there, and not in the discovery of the latest galaxy or subatomic particle, that the seed of human meaning lies; whether or not this be so, a human cannot find meaning without the Other, since it is not even imaginable: we are born of Others, we meet with Others, we are in turn the fathers and mothers of Others. 
The family
The family is possibly the best expression of the relationships between interrelated Others, consequently generating ethical questions as a result of their meetings. 10 
The family and non-substitution
The members of a family are not substitutable for similar or for better qualified people. In contrast with the employees of an organization, members of a family cannot be substi- When a family loses a child, some health professionals will advise that it is not a good idea to have another child to substitute the first. The loss of a child cannot be repaired by substitution, it can be understood and even accepted. One family member cannot be substituted by an Other, who will be recognized not as the lost one, but as someone who comes with the mission of repairing a loss. Many statements given by young patients who have undergone diagnostic testing for familial adenomatous polyposis reflect this feeling of family bonds. One adolescence who was given a negative test result but had a sister already manifesting the disease said, "I think I sort of felt a bit guilty because she ended up having it and I didn't". 12 In another report, an adolescent described her parents' discomfort about her diagnosis. She described how, "When my dad realized I had it, he went and sat in the bedroom and didn't come out for like 2 hours... that really upset me when I saw what it did to my parents." 12 In contrast, a positive diagnosis of the same disease strengthened the bond. An adolescent heard the following from another member of her family who also had the disease:
The family and its bonds
"You're one of us now". 12 In another description, an adolescent says that the diagnosis meant that the family had "a special bond and we're closer now than we were before then".
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These reports demonstrate the variability of the reactions caused by situations where diagnoses reveal family bonds.
The family, intimacy and responsibility
In families, motives count for a great deal. In Nicomachean Ethics, 13 Aristotle claimed that between people who are intimate, intentions are everything. Motivation is a differentiating factor in establishing intimacy. Our perception of people's motivation can change our assessment of them and their actions. In families, actions motivated by duty have less significance than those motivated by love. In "A Doll's House", Henrik Ibsen wrote that family life ceases to be free and beautiful when it is based on tedium and obligation. One question with which it is extremely difficult to deal is the issue of preferentially selecting a baby who is a carrier of a disability. This type of demand has already been made several times in different parts of the world by deaf couples, for example. 18 Some authors have employed an argument stating that the very criterion of disability is itself arbitrary and as such can be questioned. In this specific case, the deaf community itself could be considered an independent culture.
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This argument is similar to the one used to defend selecting a sex for cultural or social reasons. According to these authors, fulfilling parents' desires should lead healthcare professionals to question the ability of people who are different from each other to live together, and should not cause discomfort due to participating in an artificial and directed selection of a human being with a disability. 22 Obligation must pass between the boundaries between desire and need. It is always worth remembering the possibility of "slippery slope" phenomena, 12 Another important issue is related to the uncertainty suffered during the process of diagnosis. One young woman said, "I don't care if it was positive or negative, but actually finding out". 12 Another young woman with a positive diagnosis said that the process of genetic counseling had helped her to understand the problem she was going to have to face. 12 In David Copperfield, Charles Dickens wrote that, "accidents will occur in the best regulated families". 25 One family, whose notion of stability is as a state, might suffer an unpredictable shock when given bad news, whereas another, whose understanding of stability is as a process, would possibly be in a better position to face this challenge creatively as a result of strategies it has already employed in other situations.
Final comments
Ethics is not something that is secondary or an adornment to life, but the most profound component of life itself which, in the process of the encounter with that of which it is formed, gives it meaning. The concrete form that ethics can assume in everyday existence is as simple in its general formulation as it is complex in terms of its daily performance:
caring. Since to care is to construct, in the careful preservation of the alterity of the other, the reason for the endurancein each and every sense of the term -of life itself. 
